Now how large is the safety net? by Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg
In this year’s debate over financial regulatory 
reform, one objective everybody agrees on is 
ending “too big to fail.” TBTF is a policy stance 
based on the belief that the failure of certain fi-
nancial firms, under certain circumstances, would 
be unacceptably disruptive to financial markets 
and the broader economy. As a result, market par-
ticipants have long believed that such firms and 
their creditors enjoyed implicit guarantees from 
the government. These beliefs have the effect of 
subsidizing leverage and risk-taking, distorting in-
centives in a way that contributed to the financial 
crisis of the last three years.
In the wake of the crisis, ideas for ending TBTF 
have ranged from the forcible break-up of large 
financial firms to the creation of a new govern-
ment resolution authority charged with liquidat-
ing distressed firms in a way that ensures credi-
tors bear losses. But to understand the effects 
of any such policy change, it is important first to 
understand the problem we are trying to solve. In 
this Economic Brief, we discuss the size of the TBTF 
problem — or, more generally, the problem of 
implicit government guarantees of financial mar-
ket obligations. We argue that the financial safety 
net is a large and growing problem. How and why 
it has grown are the keys to understanding the 
nature of the problem.
In an article published in 2002, one of the authors 
of this Economic Brief (Weinberg) and his col-
league John R. Walter attempted a measurement 
of the financial safety net.1 Using data from 1999 
they sought to count the liabilities of private 
financial firms that had either explicit or implicit 
backing from the government.
Their estimates were based on conservative 
assumptions. They included in the safety net only 
the liabilities of those firms that enjoyed protec-
tion based on legislation, or on official actions 
and statements. Explicit safety net liabilities 
consisted of the insured deposits of commercial 
banks, savings institutions, and credit unions, 
as well as the private employer pension funds 
guaranteed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the 
implicitly guaranteed liabilities were those of the 
government-sponsored enterprises — Fannie 
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Mae, Freddie Mac, the Farm Credit System, and the 
Federal Home Loan Banks. But about a quarter of 
the implicit guarantees were the uninsured deposits 
of several large banks; federal officials stated in the 
1980s that such firms would be treated as TBTF. Wal-
ter and Weinberg estimated that in 1999 the federal 
safety net totaled $8.4 trillion, or 45 percent of the 
country’s financial liabilities.
How big is the financial safety net now? Walter and 
co-author Nadezhda Malysheva have updated these 
estimates to the end of 2008.2 Their paper (available 
on richmondfed.org) continues to use the same con-
servative criteria that were used for the 1999 
estimate — only firms that received protection by 
word or deed were included. This means, for exam-
ple, that the 19 institutions subject to “stress tests” — 
many of whom were omitted from the 1999 estimate 
— were included. 
Walter and Malysheva estimate that as of December 
2008 the federal financial safety net protected $25 
trillion in liabilities, or 58 percent of all financial li-
abilities, up considerably from 45 percent nine years 
earlier. These estimates are conservative, as we have 
argued, and exclude liabilities — such as money 
market mutual funds — that one might reasonably 
presume could receive support again, as they did  
in 2008. 
How did the financial safety net come to cover nearly 
three-fifths of the financial sector? The arithmetic an-
swer is the expansion in the portion of the financial 
sector benefiting from implicit guarantees — that is, 
guarantees that are implied or inferred rather than 
those that result from formally legislated programs, 
such as deposit insurance. In 1999, the implicit safety 
net covered only 18 percent of financial sector liabili-
ties. At the end of 2008, 36 percent of the financial 
sector was covered by implicit government guaran-
tees. In contrast, the portion of the financial sector 
covered by explicit guarantees fell from 27 percent in 
1999 to 22 percent in 2008.
Why has the implicit safety net grown so large? We 
would argue that ambiguity about implicit guaran-
tees sets up forces that inexorably expand the safety 
net over time. Letting a firm viewed as TBTF file for 
bankruptcy would risk a sudden investor retreat 
from similar firms, on the belief that the government 
might not support them either. This would just add 
to financial market volatility in an already volatile 
situation, which is why the urgency to protect credi-
tors and counterparties becomes overwhelming 
during a crisis. Policymakers feel compelled to act in 
ways they find repugnant, even as they recognize the 
moral hazard costs. 
The resolution of uncertainty about implicit safety 
net guarantees is thus biased toward intervention, 
which expands the safety net over time. Popular ac-
counts view rescues as necessitated by the distressed 
firm’s large and complex web of financial relation-
ships, which are said to be too costly to unwind. But 
these direct domino effects have been largely absent 
in this recent crisis, as illustrated by the relatively 
smooth unwinding of Lehman Brothers’ positions 
in bankruptcy. Rather, the volatility following Lehm-
an’s failure reflected investors reassessing whether 
other firms might or might not receive government-
support. The aspect of interconnectedness that  
mattered most in this crisis was financial firms’ 
common reliance on an ambiguous and uncertain 
government safety net policy.
Many of the ideas put forward in recent policy 
debates would perpetuate that ambiguity. Giving 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or 
another government entity the authority to take a 
failing institution into receivership, culminating in 
liquidation, seems a natural extension of the FDIC’s 
treatment of troubled banks. But the FDIC would be 
allowed to provide funds to the receiver that could 
be used to settle short-term debts as they come due. 
Even if shareholders are dutifully “wiped out” and the 
firm ultimately closed, the protection of short-term 
creditors weakens the incentives of the most critical 
liability holders. Despite their best intentions, author-
ities will inevitably err on the side of rescue, which 
will further weaken market discipline and lead to an 
ever-widening sphere of intervention and distorted 
incentives. A provision that provides for clawbacks Page 3
Source: Calculations by Richmond Fed staff from numerous data sources. For a more detailed explanation, see the appendix in Malysheva and  
Walter (2010).
Note: Figures may not sum exactly due to rounding.
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36%of funds advanced that prove to be in excess of what 
claimants would have received in a bankruptcy can 
restore some discipline to the process. But there is 
likely to be enough uncertainty — and contentious-
ness — about clawbacks that the end result will still 
be that those claimants benefit at the margin from 
the use of public funds.
It does not really matter whether this additional sup-
port is “pre-funded” through fees on financial institu-
tions or funded after the fact. The discretionary use 
of funds by the government to shield certain credi-
tors from harm is what distorts incentives and leads 
to excessive risk-taking. 
Real regulatory reform would sharply restrict the 
power of government entities, including the Fed, to 
provide funds to failing institutions. After the bank-
ing crisis of the 1980s, the FDIC Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) took a step in this direction by imposing a 
“least-cost resolution” requirement on the FDIC and 
restricting the Fed’s ability to lend to failing banks. 
But FDICIA provided a “systemic risk” exemption and 
preserved the Fed’s Section 13(3) emergency lending 
authority. This meant that the creditors of large insti-
tutions still had a reasonable expectation of support 
in the event of a crisis. Real reform would include ex-
tending the FDICIA least-cost resolution constraints 
to all FDIC-resolved failures and abolishing the Fed’s 
13(3) powers.
Granted, a resolution procedure that does not allow 
special treatment for short-term creditors could 
make such funding more expensive. But surely this 
crisis demonstrated that short-term credit was too 
cheap and plentiful, and that the financial system 
was too fragile as a result. Reducing the use of short-
term credit to fund illiquid assets would enhance 
financial stability. 
Our discussion of the TBTF problem has not really 
been about how big a firm is, or even about whether 
or not a firm fails. Rather, our focus is on ambiguity 
surrounding the use of public funds to either prevent 
a failure or soften the blow in the event of a failure. 
This ambiguity would remain a problem even if large 
firms were broken into smaller pieces. Small firms 
that rely too heavily on short-term financing will still 
be subject to runs by their creditors. And runs will 
still be viewed as having the potential to destabilize 
markets more broadly. So from the point of view of 
financial stability, the benefits of a policy that directly 
limits the size of firms are doubtful.
Resolution policy is the heart of regulatory reform. 
Getting it right is essential to credibly limiting the 
size of the financial safety net, restoring market dis-
cipline, and truly ending “too big to fail.” If we don’t, 
financial crises are bound to recur. g
Jeffrey M. Lacker and John A. Weinberg are presi-
dent and senior vice president and director of 
research, respectively, of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Richmond. The views expressed are their own.
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